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COMPUTATIONS OF VOLUMES AND EHRHART SERIES IN FOUR
CANDIDATES ELECTIONS
WINFRIED BRUNS, BOGDAN ICHIM, AND CHRISTOF SO¨GER
ABSTRACT. We describe several experimental results obtained in four candidates social
choice elections. These include the Condorcet and Borda paradoxes, as well as the Con-
dorcet efficiency of plurality voting with runoff. The computations are done by Normaliz.
It finds precise probabilities as volumes of polytopes and counting functions encoded as
Ehrhart series of polytopes.
1. INTRODUCTION
In [23, p. 382] Lepelley, Louichi and Smaoui state:
Consequently, it is not possible to analyze four candidate elections, where
the total number of variables (possible preference rankings) is 24. We hope
that further developments of these algorithms will enable the overcoming
of this difficulty.
Normaliz [12] is a software tool that (in particular) may be used for the computation
of volumes and Ehrhart series of rational polytopes. In the 18 years of its existence it has
found numerous applications. For these, as well for its connections to several computer
algebra systems see [12]. One of the driving forces for the improvements of Normaliz in
the past years was the desire to solve the problems raised by Schu¨rmann [24], that is to
compute the volumes and Ehrhart series of certain polytopes related to social choice.
We believe that the recent development in the algorithms of Normaliz and its offspring
NmzIntegrate have (partially) solved the problem raised by Lepelley, Louichi and Smaoui.
In [8, p. 388] Brandt, Geist and Strobel write:
To the best of our knowledge, Normaliz is the only program which is able
to compute polytopes corresponding to elections with up to four alterna-
tives.
In this paper we present several results of our own computational experiments with four
candidates elections. The background of these experiments, motivated by social choice
theory and its connection with the polytope theory, may be found in Gehrlein and Lepelley
[21], Lepelley, Louichi and Smaoui, [23], Schu¨rmann [24] or Wilson and Pritchard [25].
For discrete convex geometry we refer the reader to Bruns and Gubeladze [9].
As an introductory example we discuss the Condorcet paradox whose probability of
331/2048≈ 16.2% for four candidates has been known for quite a while (Gehrlein [19]).
We continue with the Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting (see [24]) and complement
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it by the Condorcet efficiency of plurality elections with cutoff. While plurality voting
has Condorcet efficiency 74.3%, a runoff ballot of two candidates increases it to 91.2%.
The gain is substantial and justifies runoff ballots that are part of many voting procedures.
(In this introduction we content ourselves with approximate probabilities; precise rational
numbers will be given later on.)
Another problem discussed in [24] is “plurality versus runoff”, namely the probability
of 75.5% that the plurality winner also wins the runoff.
Next follows a discussion of the four types of antisymmetric relations between four
candidates that can arise from comparisons in majority, and their probabilities. As we
will see, the case (i) of a linear order is the most likely one by far. The other 3 cases,
namely that (ii) there exists a Condorcet winner, but not a loser, (iii) a loser, but not a
winner, and (iv) neither a winner, nor a loser, have small probabilities < 10%.
We conclude the list of voting outcomes with the Borda paradoxes. The strict Borda
paradox occurs if the outcome of the pairwise majority comparison is a linear order and
the plurality outcome completely reverses it. For four candidates its conditional probabil-
ity is approximately 0.156%. The strong Borda paradox has two variants, namely (i) that
the Condorcet loser wins the plurality, and (ii) that the Condorcet winner is the last in plu-
rality. As to be expected, their conditional probabilities are considerably larger, namely
about 2.268% and 2.379%. Though one would intuitively expect that these probabilities
agree, they are not equal.
All these events are discussed together with their defining inequalities in Section 2. We
would like to point out that Normaliz not only computes the volumes of the polytopes in
all cases, but also their Ehrhart series, and therefore precise numbers of election results
that represent the events under discussion, depending on the number of voters. We give
the complete numerics only for the Condordet paradox, but all data can be obtained by
request from the authors.
Ehrhart series (see Section 3) are more easily to compute for closed polytopes than for
the ones that arise if one excludes ties. However, in many cases the Ehrhart series of
the semiopen polytope can be computed from that of its closure (and conversely). The
crucial condition is that all inequalities, except the sign conditions, defining the semiopen
polytope are strict, and they are satisfied with equality by the election result in which
every preference order has the same number of voters. This follows from a variant of
Ehrhart reciprocity (for example, see [9, Th. 6.51]).
Normaliz can do all computations in dimension 24 (the number of preference orders
for four candidates), but the the computation times range from seconds (for the Con-
dorcet paradox) to a few days (for the Condorcet efficiency of the runoff scheme) on a
fast machine that allows 32 parallel threads. Schu¨rmann [24] made the elegant obser-
vation that many computations can be enormously accelerated if one uses the symmetry
that is inherent in many polytopes. Only two of the polytopes discussed in this paper do
not allow this approach, namely linear order and (consequently) the strict Borda para-
dox. Symmetrization, which requires the computation of weighted Ehrhart series, shrinks
computation times from days to hours, minutes, or even tenths of seconds, depending on
the example. Symmetrization is discussed in Section 4, and all relevant computation data
are listed in Section 5.
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The reader who is interested in a deeper understanding of the mathematics and algo-
rithms of Normaliz and NmzIntegrate is refereed to the articles by Bruns with Koch [14],
Ichim [11], Hemmecke, Ichim, Ko¨ppe and So¨ger[10], Ichim and So¨ger [13], So¨ger [15]
and Sieg and So¨ger [16].
2. POLYTOPES IN FOUR CANDIDATES ELECTIONS AND THEIR VOLUMES
2.1. Voting schemes and volumes of rational polytopes. We briefly sketch the con-
nection between rational polytopes and social choice, referring the reader to [21], [23],
[24] or [25] for details and a more extensive treatment. As an introductory example we
first consider the well-known Condorcet paradox. The polytopes P associated to it and to
other voting events are semiopen: P is the bounded set of solutions of a system of linear
equations and inequalities in which some of the inequalities may be strict.
Consider an election in which each of the k voters fixes a linear preference order of n
candidates. In other words, voter i chooses a linear order j1 ≻i · · · ≻i jn of the candidates
1, . . . ,n. There are N = n! such linear orders that we list lexicographically. The election
result is the N-tuple (v1, . . . ,vN) in which vp is the number of voters that have chosen the
preference order p. Then v1+ · · ·+vN = k, and (v1, . . . ,vN) can be considered as a lattice
point in the positive orthant RN+ of R
B, more precisely, as a lattice point in the simplex
U
(n)
k
= RN+∩Ak = k
(
RN+∩A1
)
= kU(n)
where Ak is the hyperplane defined by v1 + · · ·+ vN = k, and U
(n) = U
(n)
1 is the unit
simplex of dimensionN−1 naturally embedded in N-space. (U(n) is the convex hull of the
unit vectors; see Figure 1.) The further discussion is based on the Impartial Anonymous
x1
1 x2
1
x3
1
FIGURE 1. The unit simplex in R3
Culture assumption that all lattice points in the simplex U
(n)
k have equal probability of
being the outcome of the election.
We fix a specific outcome v = (v1, . . . ,vN). By the majority rule candidate j beats
candidate j′ in the election with result v if
(2.1) #{i : j ≻i j
′ : i= 1, . . . ,k}> #{i : j′ ≻i j : i= 1, . . . ,k}.
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As the Marquis de Condorcet [17] observed, the relation “beats” is nontransitive in gen-
eral, and one must ask for the probability of Condorcet’s paradoxon, namely an outcome
without a Condorcet winner, where candidate j is a Condorcet winner if j beats all other
candidates j′. The Condorcet winner will sometimes be denoted CW in the following.
Given the number k of voters, let p
(n, j)
CW (k) denote the probability that candidate j is the
Condorcet winner, and p
(n)
CW(k) the probability that there is a Condorcet winner at all. By
symmetry and by mutual exclusion, p
(n)
CW(k) = n · p
(n, j)
CW (k).
Now, if we assume that the number k of voters is very large, then we are mainly inter-
ested in the limit
p
(n)
CW = lim
k→∞
p
(n)
CW(k) = n lim
k→∞
p
(n, j)
CW (k) = n · p
(n, j)
CW .
Let us fix candidate 1. It is not hard to see that the n− 1 inequalities (2.1) for j = 1
and j′ = 2, . . . ,n constitute homogeneous linear inequalities in the variables v1, . . . ,vN .
Together with the sign conditions vi ≥ 0 they define a semi-open subpolytope C
(n)
k of
U
(n)
k . Then
(2.2) p
(n,1)
CW = lim
k→∞
#(C
(n)
k ∩Z
N)
#(U
(n)
k ∩Z
N)
=
volC
(n)
1
volU
(n)
1
= volC
(n)
where denotes closure and C(n) = C
(n)
1 . For the validity of (2.2) note that we work with
the lattice normalized volume in which the unit simplex has volume 1.
In the case of two candidates, Concordet’s paradox cannot occur (if one excludes
draws), and for three candidates the relevant volume is not hard to compute, even without
a computer (see Gehrlein and Fishburn [20]).
The situation changes significantly for four candidates since C(4) has dimension 23 and
234 vertices. From now on we will simplify our notation and omit often the superscript (4)
when dealing with four candidates. As a subpolytope of U, C is cut out by the inequalities
λi(v) > 0, i = 1,2,3 whose coefficients are in the first 3 rows displayed in Table 1. For
the assignment of indices the preference orders are listed lexicographically, starting with
1≻ 2≻ 3≻ 4 and ending with 4≻ 3≻ 2≻ 1.
λ1: 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1
λ2: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 −1−1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1
λ3: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1
λ4: 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ5: 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1−1 −1 −1 −1−1 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ6: 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1
TABLE 1. Inequalities for C and E
Normaliz computes
volC=
1717
8192
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in a few seconds. (The combinatorial data of all polytopes discussed and the computation
times are listed in Section 5.) It follows that pCW = 1717/2048≈ 0.8384. This value was
first determined by Gehrlein in [19].
2.2. Plurality rule and runoff. The simplest way out of the dilemma that there may
not exist a Condorcet winner is plurality voting: candidate j is the plurality winner if j
has more first places in the preference orders of the voters than any of the other n− 1
candidates. A problem discussed in [24] is plurality voting versus plurality runoff. It goes
as follows. In the first round of the election the two top candidates in plurality are selected,
and in the second round the preference orders are restricted to these two candidates. In
order to model this situation by inequalities one must fix an outcome of the first round
of plurality voting, for example we may assume that candidate 1 is the winner of the first
round and candidate 2 is placed second after the first round. The chosen outcome gives
rise to n− 1 inequalities. Then the n-th inequality expresses that 1 is also the winner of
the second round. The volume of the corresponding polytope gives the probability of this
event. By mutual exclusion and symmetry, we must multiply the volume by n(n−1) in
order to obtain the probability for the event that the winner of the first plurality round
wins after runoff.
As a subpolytope of U, the polytope Q is defined by the inequalities in Table 2. The
1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1
1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1
TABLE 2. Inequalities for Q
volume is
volQ=
9185069468583833
146081389744226304
.
The total probability of the event that the winner of the first plurality round wins after
runoff is
12 ·volQ=
9185069468583833
12173449145352192
≈ 0.7545.
Therefore, the probability of the failure of the winner of the first round to win the runoff
is
1−
9185069468583833
12173449145352192
≈ 0.2455,
in accordance with the results of [24] for a similar model. This computation was first
performed by De Loera, Dutra, Ko¨ppe, Moreinis, Pinto and Wu in [18], where LattE
Integrale [4] was used for the volume computation.
2.3. Condorcet efficiency. The last problem discussed in [24] is theCondorcet efficiency
of plurality voting. It is the conditional probability that the Condorcet winner, provided
that such exists, is elected by plurality voting, as k→ ∞. (Similarly one defines the Con-
dorcet efficiency of other voting schemes.) Therefore one must compute the probability
of the event that candidate j is both the Condorcet winner and the plurality winner. By
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symmetry, one can assume j = 1. The semi-open polytope E
(n)
k , whose lattice points rep-
resent this expected outcome, is cut out from C
(n)
k by n−1 further inequalities saying that
1 has more first places than any of the other n−1 candidates. Thus one obtains
nvolE(n)
p
(n)
CW
as the Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting where E(n) = E
(n)
1 .
The extra 3 inequalities λi(v)> 0, i= 4,5,6, given in the last 3 lines of Table 1 increase
the complexity of the polytope E enormously in comparison to C. Nevertheless, Normaliz
computes the volume in moderate time. We have obtained
volE=
10658098255011916449318509
68475651442606080000000000
,
so that the Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting turns out to be
4volE
pCW
=
10658098255011916449318509
14352135440302080000000000
≈ 0.7426,
in perfect accordance with [24].
Remark 1. Schu¨rmann [24] used variants of the polytopes Q and E. Our choices (which
are demanding slightly more computational resources) avoid inclusion–exclusion calcu-
lations that would come up in Section 3.
It is interesting to compare the Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting to the the Con-
dorcet efficiency of the runoff voting scheme. In other words, given that there exists a
Condorcet winner, what is the probability that she or he is at least second in plurality?
As above, let us assume that candidate 1 is the Condorcet winner. Then there are n
possible cases. The first case is when candidate 1 is the plurality winner as well, and this
case was studied above. The other n−1 cases are associated to the event that candidate
j wins or ties candidate 1 in plurality (where j 6= 1), while candidate 1 wins the plural-
ity voting against all other candidates. By symmetry, these n−1 cases are identical and
yield the same volume. The n cases are mutually disjoint and exhaust all the possibilities.
(Disjointness is important in Section 3 for avoiding complicated inclusion–exclusion cal-
culations.) The semi-open polytope F
(n)
1, j , whose lattice points represent the outcome of
the cases j = 2, . . . ,n, is cut out from C
(n)
k by the closed condition that candidate j wins
against or ties with candidate 1 in plurality and by n− 2 inequalities saying that 1 has
more first places than the remaining n−2 candidates. Thus one obtains
nvolE(n)+n(n−1)volF(n)
p
(n)
CW
as the the Condorcet efficiency of the runoff, where F(n) = F
(n)
1,2.
As a subpolytope of U, the polytope F is defined by the inequalities in Table 3, where
the last line should be interpreted as −λ4(v)≥ 0, expressing the condition that candidate
1 does not beat candidate 2 in plurality.
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λ1: 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1
λ2: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 1 −1−1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1
λ3: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1
λ5: 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ6: 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1
−λ4:−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE 3. Inequalities for F
The volume is
volF =
7280153240719060220104571
616280862983454720000000000
.
Finally, the Condorcet efficiency of the runoff is
4volE+12volF
pCW
=
19627224002877404784030049
21528203160453120000000000
≈ 0.9117.
2.4. Condorcet classification. In this subsection we classify the asymmetric relations
between four candidates given by the majority rule. To the best of our knowledge the
computations of the probabilities of the classes is new.
Let us first outline a duality argument that will be used several times below. Consider
an election result v= (v1, . . . ,vN) for n candidates, where N = n!, the N preference orders
pi1, . . . ,piN are listed in some order, and vi is the number of voters of pii. Each preference
order has an inverse c(pi) that ranks the candidates in inverse order relative to pi: the
inverse order to 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 is 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1 etc. The assignment pi → c(pi) defines
a permutation of the sequence 1, . . . ,N, sending i to the index of c(pii). The induced
permutation of the coordinates of RN is called inversion of preference orders. It inverts
all comparisons in majority. In particular it turns a Condorcet winner into a Condorcet
loser, and conversely.
The results of the n candidates elections may be classified in two main categories:
(A) There exists a Condorcet winner. As seen above, in the case of four candidates
elections the results fall into this category with probability
P(∃ Condorcet Winner) = 1717/2048≈ 0.8384.
(B) There exists no Condorcet winner. For four candidates elections the results fall
into this category with probability
P(∄ Condorcet Winner) = 1−1717/2048= 331/2048≈ 0.1616.
We refer the reader to Gehrlein and Lepelley [21, Section 3.2.1] or [22] for a discussion
of the three candidates situation. Note that in the three candidates scenario the event that
there exist a linear order on the result of the majority voting is the same as the event that
there exists a Condorcet winner, since the other two candidates are automatically ordered.
This no longer true for four or more candidates. Even if a Condorcet winner exists, the
remaining candidates need not to be linearly ordered. Therefore, we need to further refine
our classification.
We discuss the case of four candidates in detail:
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(A) Assume that a Condorcet winner (CW) does exist. This situation must be split
into two subcategories:
(1) The result of the majority voting defines a linear order of the candidates. This
further implies (independently of the number of candidates n) that there also
exists a Condorcet loser (CL).
(2) There exist no linear order on the result of the majority voting. In the (partic-
ular) case of four candidates elections this is equivalent to saying that there
exists a cycle of length three among the lower candidates (i.e., the three can-
didates Condorcet Paradox) or that there exists no Condorcet loser.
(B) Now assume the case that a Condorcet winner does not exist. This situation must
also be split into two subcategories:
(1) There exists a cycle of order three among the candidates and a Condorcet
loser. Inversion of preference orders turns this case into (A2). In particular
they have the same probability.
(2) There exist a cycle of length four among the candidates or (equivalently) there
exists no Condorcet loser. This condition defines only 4 of the 6 relations
between the candidates, but it easy to check that all 4 possibilities for the
remaining 2 relations are equivalent up to a renaming of the candidates.
A
C
B
D
A
C
B
D
A
C
B
D
A
C
B
D
FIGURE 2. Oriented graphs representing the Condorcet classes of four
candidates with respect to the relation given by the majority rule
In order to compute the probabilities of the 4 classes, we consider the polytope T which
corresponds to the event that candidate 1 beats candidates 2,3,4, candidate 2 beats can-
didates 3,4 and candidate 3 beats candidates 4. In other words, T represents the linear
order. As a subpolytope of U, the polytope T is defined by the inequalities in Table 4.
(Note that βi = λi for i= 1,2,3.)
β1: 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1
β2: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1
β3: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1
β4: 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 1 −1 1 1 −1−1
β5: 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1
β6: 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1
TABLE 4. Inequalities for T
We have obtained
volT =
5507086513
173946175488
,
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Since a set of 4 elements admits 24 possible linear orders, the probability to have a linear
order on the result of the majority voting is
P(∃ CW,∃ CL) =
5507086513
7247757312
≈ 0.7598.
It follows that the probability that a Condorcet winner does exists, and still there exist no
linear order on the result of the majority voting is
P(∃ CW,∄ CL) =
1717
2048
−
5507086513
7247757312
=
569280335
7247757312
≈ 0.07855.
By the duality argument observed in the case (B1) the probability that a Condorcet loser
does exists, but no Condorcet winner, is
P(∄ CW,∃ CL) =
569280335
7247757312
≈ 0.07855
as well. The probability of the remaining class (B2), the existence of a 4-cycle, is
P(∄ CW,∄ CL) = 1−
5507086513
7247757312
−2∗
569280335
7247757312
=
602110129
7247757312
≈ 0.0831.
As a test for the correctness of the algorithm, we have nevertheless computed the prob-
ability of a 4-cycle directly. To this end, we consider the polytopeK corresponding to the
event that candidate 1 beats candidates 2, candidate 2 beats candidates 3, candidate 3 beats
candidates 4 and candidate 4 beats candidates 1. As a subpolytope of U, the polytope K
is defined by the inequalities in Table 5. We have obtained
β1: 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 1 1 −1−1 1 −1 1 1 −1−1 1 −1
β4: 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1
β6: 1 −1 1 1 −1−1 1 −1 1 1 −1−1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1
κ :−1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE 5. Inequalities for K
volK=
602110129
43486543872
,
Since a set of 4 elements admits 6 possible cycles of length four among the elements (if
we fix one element there are 6 possible linear orders among the remaining three elements),
one obtains exactly the same probability for the class (B2) that was computed indirectly
above.
2.5. Borda paradoxes. In this subsection we study a family of voting paradoxes, first
introduced by the Chevalier de Borda in [7]. To the best of our knowledge all volume
computations in this subsection are new.
The strict Borda paradox appears in a voting situation when there is a complete reversal
of the ranking of candidates given by the majority voting and plurality voting. In order
to model this situation by inequalities one must fist assume that there exist a linear order
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on the result of the majority voting that involves all n candidates, say 1, . . . ,n in this order
(there are n! possible outcomes). The chosen outcome gives rise to
n(n−1)
2
inequalities. Then one must add n− 1 inequalities expressing that the order was com-
pletely reversed by the plurality voting. The volume of the corresponding polytope gives
the probability of this event. By mutual exclusion and symmetry, we must multiply the
volume by n! and then take the conditional probability under the hypothesis that such a
linear order exists.
As a subpolytope of U, the polytope BSt is defined by the inequalities in Table 6. Note
β1: 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 1 1 −1−1 1 −1 1 1 −1−1 1 −1
β2: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1
β3: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1−1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1
β4: 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1
β5: 1 1 1 −1 −1−1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1
β6: 1 −1 1 1 −1−1 1 −1 1 1 −1−1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1
β7: −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β8: 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
β9: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE 6. Inequalities for BSt
that the first six inequalities describe the event that the result of the majority voting yields
a linear order. We have obtained
volBSt =
1281727528386311499990911876166511
25940255058441281524973174784000000000
.
Finally, conditioned by the assumption that there exists a linear order on the result of
the majority voting, we get the probability of the strict Borda paradox for large numbers
of voters,
BSt =
24 ·volBSt
24 ·volT
=
1281727528386311499990911876166511
821261107784328041072841984000000000
≈ 0.00156.
Remark 2. (a) The inequalities defining the strict Borda paradox have an obvious prop-
erty, which we only state since it does not hold in the case of the strong Borda paradox
discussed below: it does not matter if one considers the inequalities in Table 6 or the in-
equalities defined by the same linear forms multiplied by −1. In fact, the multiplication
by−1 reverses the linear order on the candidates both for majority and plurality, and thus
amounts to a renaming of the candidates.
(b) Onemay ask, as in [22], what happens if the negative plurality rule is used instead of
the plurality rule. The negative plurality rule requires the voters to cast a vote against their
least preferred candidate. It is not difficult to see that inversion of the preference orders as
discussed in subsection 2.4 above, maps an event representing the strict Borda paradox for
plurality to an event representing the strict Borda paradox for negative plurality. Therefore
no new computation is necessary.
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(c) With the notation used in [22, Formula 19], we have
BSt = P
PR
StBR(4,k, IAC) = P
NPR
StBR(4,k, IAC) for k→ ∞.
We note that the probability of observing the strict Borda paradox in four candidates
elections (under the Impartial Anonymous Culture hypothesis) is significantly smaller
than the probability of observing the strict Borda paradox in three candidates elections,
which was computed in [22, Formula 19] and is 1/90≈ 0.0111.
The strong Borda paradox is the voting situation in which there is an inversion between
the winner or the loser from the majority voting to plurality voting. It appears that de
Borda was primarily concerned with the outcome that plurality voting might elect the
majority voting loser [7]. In the following we say that the strong Borda paradox occurs
if the Condorcet loser is the winner of the plurality voting. Let us assume that candidate
1 is the Condorcet loser. Next, by assuming that 1 wins the plurality we obtain n−1 new
inequalities. Each candidate may fulfill these conditions, so by symmetry the result must
be multiplied by n. Finally, the conditional probability has to be computed.
As a subpolytope of U, the polytope BSg is defined by the inequalities in Table 7. One
−β1:−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1−1 1 1 −1 1
−β2:−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1−1 −1 1 1 1
−β3:−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
β10: 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
β11: 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1−1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
β12: 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1−1 −1 −1−1 −1
TABLE 7. Inequalities for BSg
gets
volBSg =
325451674835828550681491
68475651442606080000000000
.
Combined with the previous computations, we obtain the probability of the strong Borda
paradox for large numbers of voters:
BSg =
4 ·volBSg
pCW
=
325451674835828550681491
14352135440302080000000000
≈ 0.02268.
(We have used that the probability that there exists a Condorcet loser equals the probabil-
ity that there exists a Condorcet winner.)
The situation when the Condorcet winner is the loser of the plurality voting presents
also interest, in which case we say that the reverse strong Borda paradox appears. This
situation is easy to model: we simply have to multiply the linear forms of Table 7 by −1.
In other words, as a subpolytope of U, the polytope BSgRev is defined by the inequalities
β1, β2, β4,−β10,−β11,−β12. Its volume is given by
volBSgRev =
104898234852130241
21035720123168587776
.
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Combined with the previous computations, we get the probability of the reverse strong
Borda paradox for large numbers of voters
BSgRev =
4 ·volBSgRev
pCW
=
104898234852130241
4408976007260798976
≈ 0.02379.
Though the difference between the two forms of the strong Borda paradox may seem
surprising, there are very simple arguments for the asymmetry, independent of any com-
putations. See Remark 8(c).
Remark 3. (a) Again one may ask what happens if the negative plurality rule (NPR) is
used for the strong Borda paradox (BP) and its reverse variant. In total we then have 4
variants. But the 2 new variants are isomorphic to those considered above via the inversion
of preference orders:
reverse BP with NPR ∼= BP, BP with NPR ∼= reverse BP.
In fact, the inversion of preference orders turns an event representing the strong Borda
paradox for plurality into an event for the reverse strong Borda paradox with negative
plurality. Similarly it exchanges the events within the other pair.
(b) With the notation used in [22, Formula 20], we have
BSg = P
PR
SgBR(4,k, IAC) and
BSgRev = P
NPR
SgBR(4,k, IAC) for k→ ∞.
We note that the probability of observing the strong Borda paradox in four candidates
elections under the plurality rule (respectively the negative plurality rule) is smaller, but
still of the same magnitude, with the probability of observing the strong Borda paradox in
three candidates elections under the plurality rule (respectively the negative plurality rule),
which was computed in [22, Formula 20] and is 4/135≈ 0.0296 (respectively 17/540≈
0.0315).
Remark 4. After the initial submission of this paper to arXiv.org, Lepelley informed us
by e-mail that several volume computations can also be done by a combination of the
software packages LattE [4] and lrs [3]. He has obtained precisely the same results as we.
This is a good test for the correctness of all algorithms involved.
3. COMPUTATIONS OF EHRHART SERIES AND QUASIPOLYNOMIALS ARISING IN
FOUR CANDIDATES ELECTIONS
While the probability of a certain type of election result, for example the Condorcet
paradox, can be computed as the volume of a polytope (or the sum of such volumes),
one can use the polyhedral method also to find the exact number of election results of the
given type for a specific number k of voters. For example, if C is the semiopen polytope
defined by the condition that candidate 1 is the Condorcet winner, then the number of
election results for k voters with Condorcet winner 1 is
E(C,k) = #(kC∩ZN+).
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The function E(C,k) is called the Ehrhart function of C. The best approach to its compu-
tations uses the generating function
EP(t) =
∞
∑
k=0
E(C,k)tk.
This Ehrhart series is the power series expansion of a rational function at the origin. It
is computed as a rational function, and in the following we will always represent Ehrhart
series in the form numerator/denominator. The numerator is a polynomial with integer
coefficients. The denominator can always be written as a product of d terms 1− tg, d =
dimP+1:
EP(t) =
h0+h1t+ · · ·+hst
s
(1− tg1) · · ·(1− tgd)
, hi ∈ Z.
Note that in general there exists no canonical representation in this form; see Bruns, Ichim
and So¨ger [13, Section 4] for a brief discussion of this problem. If P is closed, then
h0 = 1, and the denominator can be chosen in such a way that all hi are nonnegative. In
the semiopen case such a representation may not exist. The theory of Ehrhart series is
developed in several books, for example in [9]. For a treatment under the aspect of social
choice we refer the reader to [23].
For closed polytopes P, the Ehrhart function E(P,k) itself is given by a quasipolyno-
mial qP for all k ≥ 0. Roughly speaking, this means that qP(k) is a polynomial whose
coefficients depend periodically on k. The period is a divisor of the least common mul-
tiple of the exponents g in the factors 1− tg in the denominator. In the Normaliz output
the period is always exactly the least common multiple. In the semiopen case one has
E(P,k) = qP(k) only for sufficiently large k. More precisely, if r is the degree of EP(t) as
a rational function, then E(P,r) 6= qP(r), but E(P,k) = qP(k) for all k > r.
For n= 4 the Ehrhart series of C has the numerator
6t1+15t2+481t3+890t4+12346t5+17845t6
+152891t7+180850t8+1113216t9+1111974t10+5320122t11
+4580485t12+17837843t13+13415068t14+43770180t15+28993857t16
+80758791t17+47336170t18+113925878t19+59177761t20+123966919t21
+56990048t22+104272000t23+42243510t24+67509138t25+23917200t26
+33268048t27+10182887t28+12235441t29+3176870t30+3255226t31
+697232t32+596834t33+100915t34+69821t35+8655t36
+4581t37+363t38+133t39+5t40+ t41.
The Ehrhart series of C has the numerator
1+5t1+133t2+363t3+4581t4
+8655t5+69821t6+100915t7+596834t8+697232t9
+3255226t10+3176870t11+12235441t12+10182887t13+33268048t14
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+23917200t15+67509138t16+42243510t17+104272000t18+56990048t19
+123966919t20+59177761t21+113925878t22+47336170t23+80758791t24
+28993857t25+43770180t26+13415068t27+17837843t28+4580485t29
+5320122t30+1111974t31+1113216t32+180850t33+152891t34
+17845t35+12346t36+890t37+481t38+15t39+6t40.
Both have the same denominator
(1− t)(1− t2)14(1− t4)9.
Numerator and denominator are coprime, but in general one cannot find a coprime repre-
sentation if one insists on a denominator that is a product of terms 1− tg.
If we write the numerator of C as ∑40i=0 ait
i, then the numerator of C is ∑40i=0 a40−it
i+1:
up to a shift in degree, they are palindromes of each other. This rather unexpected rela-
tionship is not an accident, and is explained by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let λ1, . . . ,λm be linear forms on R
d , and let 1 ∈ Rd be the vector with the
entry 1 at all coordinates. Suppose that λi(1) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Set C = {x ∈ R
d
+ :
λi(x)≥ 0, i= 1 . . . ,m}, and
D= {x ∈ Rd+ : λi(x)> 0, i= 1 . . . ,m}.
Define the he semiopen polytope P by
P= {x ∈ D : ∑xi = 1}.
If dimP= d−1 (the maximal dimension), then the following hold:
(1) J = I−1, where J is the set of lattice points in D and I is the set of interior lattice
points of C.
(2)
EP(t) = (−1)
d t−dE
P
(t−1).
(3) Suppose that
E
P
(t) =
h0+h1t · · ·+hst
s
(1− tg1) · · ·(1− tgd)
.
Then the Ehrhart series of P has the numerator polynomial
hst
w+ · · ·+h0t
w+s, w=
d
∑
i=1
gi−d− s,
over the same denominator.
Proof. The crucial observation is (1). Since dimP= d−1, the interior ofC is
{x : xi > 0, i= 1, . . . ,d, λ j(x)> 0, j = 1, . . . ,m}.
For lattice points x∈Zd these inequalities amount to xi ≥ 1 and λ j(x)≥ 1. Thus x belongs
to the interior ofC if and only if x−1 satisfies the inequalities xi ≥ 0 for i= 1, . . . ,d, and
λ j(x)> 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m. This proves J = I−1.
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By Ehrhart reciprocity (for example, see [9, Th. 6.51]) the Ehrhart series of the interior
of P is (−1)dE
P
(t−1). In view of (1) we have to multiply this series by t−d to obtain the
Ehrhart series of P. This gives (2).
Part (3) is now an elementary transformation. 
Remark 6. (a) The condition λi(1) = 0 in Theorem 5 is equivalent to the natural assump-
tion that it only depends on the differences vi− v j whether a voting result (v1, . . . ,vd)
belongs to the event defined by the inequalities.
(b) We have formulated Theorem 5 for the grading by total degree. It can easily be
generalized to other gradings.
In the case of our polytopes we have d = 24. So, for C we obtain ∑di=1 gi− d− s =
65− 24− 40 = 1, as observed. Theorem 5 is applicable to all polytopes in Section 2
with the exception of F. Nevertheless we have computed both Ehrhart series in each case
since the comparison is an excellent test of the Normaliz algorithm. For F the formula in
Theorem 5 does indeed not hold.
The Ehrhart quasipolynomials of C and C have period 4. Moreover, they are equal for
an odd number of voters k and have the same expression
#(Ck∩Z
N) = #(Ck∩Z
N) =
R1,3(k)∗ (12+ k)∗∏
23
i=1,i odd (i+ k)
23!∗131072
(for k ≡ 1,3 mod 4), where
R1,3(k) = 261812975764725+308449567353120k+165347938576012k
2
+50600971266720k3+9607752151310k4+1183838427360k5
+96296973756k6+5130593760k7+172122725k8+3296640k9+27472k10.
Let us reformulate this result in terms of probabilities. With the notation introduced at
the beginning of Section 2, we have
p
(4)
CW(k) = 4p
(4,1)
CW (k),
where
p
(4,1)
CW k(k) =
#(Ck∩Z
N)
#(Uk∩ZN)
.
Since
#(Uk∩Z
N) =
∏23i=1(i+ k)
23!
we get
p
(4)
CW(k) =
R1,3(k)∗ (12+ k)
32768∗∏23i=1,i even (i+ k)
if k ≡ 1,3 mod 4.
This is exactly the same formula as the one computed first by Gehrlein in [19]. For the
case of even k we set
R0(k) = 4981367114669230129152000+11069309139290261311979520k+11286725167650172468985856k
2
+6970525765323041332002816k3 +2896901556002851225731072k4 +857336679021412589010944k5
+187293111169997407690752k6 +30935327102400429176832k7 +3923664152075008433664k8
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+385511913998009006208k9 +29422431828810359328k10 +1738486466127164288k11+
+78715287099505056k12 +2678620940814672k13 +66260942646564k14
+1124326347564k15 +11698573833k16 +56262656k17
and
R2(k) = 9794451243189989376000+921057250987916963020800k+1705900639387417842032640k
2
+1489106767895973053595648k3 +792353026020511342854144k4 +284373446368099671547904k5
+72772788665361422238720k6 +13747699097527641501696k7 +1960073323091557035648k8
+213683286033339310848k9 +17913763440866689440k10+1153396601212907264k11
+56538334354261872k12+2071748534241792k13+54936786331200k14
+995421043392k15+11023421961k16+56262656k17,
then we get
p
(4)
CW(k) =


R0(k)∗k
67108864∗∏5i=0(1+4∗i+k)(2+4∗i+k)(3+4∗i+k)
if k ≡ 0 mod 4;
R2(k)∗k
67108864∗∏5i=0(4∗i+k)(1+4∗i+k)(3+4∗i+k)
if k ≡ 2 mod 4.
To the best of our knowledge the above formula for an even number of voters has not been
computed before our computations with Normaliz.
Remark 7. With the notation used in [21, Formula 1.27 and 1.29], we have
p
(4)
CW(k) = P
S
PMRW(4,k, IAC) for all k ∈ Z+.
For the other eight polytopes, since the numerators of the Ehrhart series are very long,
we only list the denominators for a representation similar to the one given above for C
and C (with non-coprime numerators):
Q,Q : (1− t)(1− t2)2(1− t4)5(1− t12)16,
E,E,F,F,BSg,BSg : (1− t)(1− t
2)2(1− t4)5(1− t12)4(1− t24)(1− t120)11,
T,T : (1− t)(1− t2)14(1− t4)5(1− t12)3(1− t24),
K,K : (1− t)(1− t2)14(1− t4)5(1− t12)4,
BSt,BSt : (1− t)(1− t
2)2(1− t4)5(1− t12)4(1− t24)(1− t120)4
(1− t840)2(1− t2520)2(1− t27720)2(1− t55440),
BSgRev,BSgRev : (1− t)(1− t
2)2(1− t4)6(1− t12)3(1− t24)12.
The denominators have 24 factors. All computed data is available and will be provided
by the authors on request.
The reciprocity between EP(t) and EP in Theorem 5 can be recast into a relation be-
tween the Ehrhart quasipolynomials. In terms of quasipolynomials, Ehrhart reciprocity
says qrelintP(k) = (−1)
d−1q
P
(−k) for all k ≥ 1 (for example, see [9, Th. 6.51]), and in
view of Theorem 5 this implies
qP(ℓ) = (−1)
d−1(−ℓ−d).
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It follows that under the conditions of Theorem 5 one has E(P,k) = qP(k) for all k>−d,
and therefore for all k > 0.
Remark 8. (a) In Table 8 we summarize the essential data of the numerators of the
Ehrhart series of the polytopes (with the exception of F), according to the notations in-
troduced in Theorem 5. The last column represents the period of the associated Ehrhart
quasipolynomials.
Polytope d s ∑gi w period
C 24 40 65 1 4
Q 24 190 217 3 12
E 24 1392 1417 1 120
T 24 84 109 1 24
K 24 70 97 3 12
BSt 24 118144 118177 9 55440
BSg 24 1388 1417 5 120
BSgRev 24 326 353 3 24
TABLE 8. Data for the numerators of the Ehrhart series and quasipolynomials
(b) The numerator of F is a polynomial of degree 1386 whereas the numerator of F has
degree 1389. They are not related by Theorem 5, so the Ehrhart series must be computed
separately by Normaliz. The Ehrhart quasipolynomials of F and F have period 120.
(c) The number w in Table 8 is the smallest number of voters that can realize the re-
spective election outcome since it is the lowest exponent of t that appears in the Ehrhart
series (when written as a power series). Note the different values of BSg and BSgRev for
w.
The values of w can be checked by elementary arguments, independently from the
Ehrhart series computation. We explain it for the strong Borda paradox. Let candidate 1
be the plurality winner. Then he has got more first places, say m, than any of the three
other candidates. On the other hand, he is the Condorcet loser, and therefore there must be
behind any of the other candidates in at least m+1 preference orders. Another candidate,
for example 2, gets first place in at least one of these m+ 1 preference orders. Then
m> 1, so m≥ 2. For the total number of voters k it follows that k ≥ 2m+1≥ 5. But the
strong Borda paradox can be realized by 5 voters: two of them place candidate 1 first, and
the other three place the different other 3 candidates first, but candidate 1 last. Note that
the same argument works for any number of candidates, with the exception of the three
candidates situation where the minimal number of voters is 7. Similarly one can see that,
for four candidates elections, the reverse strong Borda paradox requires only 3 voters and
the strict Borda paradox needs 9 of them.
4. THE EXPLOITATION OF SYMMETRY
The elegant approach of Schu¨rmann in [24] for the computation of the volumes of C
and variants of Q and E uses the high degree of symmetries of these polytopes. Suppose
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that a polytope P⊂ Rd is defined by the sign inequalities xi ≥ 0, i= 1, . . . ,d, and further
inequalities λi(x) ≥ 0 (or > 0). If certain variables xi1 , . . . ,xiu occur in all of the linear
forms λi with the same coefficient (that may depend on i), then any permutation of them
acts as a symmetry on the corresponding polytope, and the variables xi1, . . . ,xiu can be
replaced by their sum y j = xi1 + · · ·+ xiu in the λi. (The polytopes may have further
symmetries.) The substitution can be used for a projection into a space of much lower
dimension, mapping the polytope P to a polytope Q (this requires that the grading affine
hyperplane A1 is mapped onto an affine hyperplane by the projection). Instead of counting
the lattice points in kP one counts the lattice points in kQ weighted with their number of
preimage lattice points in kP. This amounts to the consideration of a weighted Ehrhart
function
k 7→ ∑
y∈kQ∩Zd
f (y).
The polynomial f is easily determined by elementary combinatorics: if y j, j = 1, . . . ,m,
is the sum of u j variables xi, then
f (y) =
(
u1+ y1−1
u1−1
)
· · ·
(
um+ ym−1
um−1
)
.
The theory of weighted Ehrhart functions has recently been developed in several pa-
pers; see Baldoni et al. [5], [6], [15]. In [24], only the leading form of the polynomial
f is used. Integration of the leading form with respect to Lesbesgue measure yields the
volume.
In the case of the Condorcet polytope C for four candidates the symmetrization yields
a polytope of dimension 7: there are two groups of 6 variables each that can be replaced
by their sums, and 6 groups of two variables each. We leave it to the reader to spot
them. Fortunately Normaliz finds them automatically. The polynomial f , also computed
automatically, is
f (y) =
(
y1+5
5
)
(y2+1)(y3+1)(y4+1)(y5+1)(y6+1)(y7+1)
(
y8+5
5
)
in this case. Among our polytopes, only T and BSt do not allow any symmetrization.
Version 3.2.1 of Normaliz calls its offspring NmzIntegrate behind the scenes for the
symmetrized computation of volumes and weighted Ehrhart series. In version 3.3.0, Nmz-
Intgerate will be included in Normaliz itself and no longer exist as a separate program.
The algorithmic approach of NmzIntegrate is developed in [15]. For polynomial arith-
metic Normaliz uses CoCoALib by Abbott, Bigatti and Lagorio [1].
5. COMPUTATIONAL REPORT
In this section we want to document the use of Normaliz 3.2.1 and computations per-
formed with it during the preparation of this work.
5.1. Use of Normaliz. Normaliz is distributed as open source under the GPL. In addition
to the source code, the distribution contains executables for the major platforms Linux,
Mac and Windows. We include some details on the use of Normaliz in order to show that
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the input files have a transparent structure and that the syntax of the execution command
is likewise simple.
The polytope F has the following input file:
amb_space 24
excluded_faces 5
1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
inequalities 1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
nonnegative
total_degree
The first line amb_space 24 sets the ambient space to R24. The 5 excluded_faces
represent the strict inequalities λi > 0, i= 1,2,3,5,6 of Table 3, whereas the non-strict in-
equality −λ4(v)≥ 0 is given by 1 inequalities. The keyword nonnegative indicates
that all 24 coordinates are to be taken nonnegative, whereas total_degree defines the
grading in which each coordinate has weight 1. Let us suppose the file is called CEP.in.
For Normaliz 3.2.1 and newer versions the simplest command for the computation is
normaliz CEP
Depending on the installation, it may be necessary to prefix normaliz or CEP by a path.
Often one adds the option -c to get terminal output showing the progress of the compu-
tation. If no further option is added, Normaliz will compute the Hilbert series and the
Hilbert basis. The computation of the latter is very fast in all cases of this paper, but one
can suppress it by the option -q. If one is only interested in the volume, -v is the right
choice. The number of parallel threads can be limited via the option -x=<N> where <N>
stands for the number of threads. The computation results are contained in CEP.out.
As will be apparent from the terminal output (obtained with -c), Normaliz successfully
tries symmetrization, and employs its companion NmzIntegrate as mentioned out above.
One should note that Normaliz does automatic symmetrization only if the cone D defined
by image Q has dimension ≤ 2dim(C)/3 where C is the cone over the polytope P to be
computed. The bound has been introduced since one cannot expect a saving in computa-
tion time if the dimension does not drop enough. However, the user can force Normaliz
to use symmetrization.
Remark 9. (a) Normaliz has an input type strict_inequalities. While it seems a
natural choice and will yield the same results as excluded_faces, its use for the com-
putations of this paper is not advisable since the algorithmic approach does not (yet) al-
low symmetrization, and even for cases without symmetrization it is usually significantly
slower than excluded_faces.
(b) A graphical interface called jNormaliz (Almendra and Ichim [2]) is also available
in the Normaliz package. For its use Java must be installed on the system.
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5.2. Overview of the examples. The columns of Table 9 contain the values of charac-
teristic numerical data of the examples studied, namely: #vertices is the number of the
vertices of the polytope, and #supp the number of its support hyperplanes. #Hilb is the
size of the Hilbert basis of the Ehrhart cone over the polytope (see [11] for more details).
These data are invariants of the polytope.
Polytope #vertices #supp #Hilb # triangulation # Stanley dec
C 234 27 242 1,344,671 1,816,323
Q 2418 28 12,948 343,466,918,256 2,217,999,266,634
E 4644 30 31,308 464,754,352,804 1,661,651,089,155
F 4572 30 26,325 1,009,992,718,827 3,400,149,589,030
T 491 30 546 2,852,958 5,635,927
K 262 28 362 1,346,894 2,694,560
BSt 6363 33 21,137 30,399,162,846 75,933,588,203
BSg 3216 30 24,816 149,924,230,551 858,660,657,413
BSgRev 3432 30 9,548 366,864,865,269 1,141,025,866,136
TABLE 9. Numerical data of test examples
The last two columns list the number of simplicial cones in the triangulation and the
number of components of the Stanley decomposition (see [13] for details on these num-
bers). These data are not invariants of the polytope. The information is included to show
the complexity of the computations if symmetrization is not used. Normaliz can do all
computations without symmetrization, but then some of them will take days, even those
with a high degree of symmetry. The size of the lexicographic triangulation depends on
the order in which the extreme rays are processed. The polytopes in the table above are
defined by their support hyperplanes, and therefore Normaliz first computes the extreme
rays from them. The order used in the computations mentioned in Table 9 is not necessar-
ily identical with the order produced by previous versions of Normaliz. Moreover, bottom
decomposition, see [16], is used automatically if the ratio of the largest degree among the
generators and the smallest is ≥ 10. This further influences the data contained in the last
two columns.
Of all our polytopes, only T and BSt cannot be symmetrized. The combinatorial data
of the symmetrized polytopes are contained in Table 10.
We remark that, for Hilbert basis computations, the dual algorithm of Normaliz (see
[11]) is much faster than the primal algorithm for the examples of this paper, and all
computations run in a few seconds. This is by no means always the case (see [13]).
5.3. Hardware characteristics. Almost all computations were run on a compute server
with operating system CentOS 7.3, 4 Intel Xeon E5-2660 at 2.20GHz (a total of 32 cores)
and 192 GB of RAM. With the exception of BSt, all computations were also done on a
standard laptop with operating system Ubuntu 16.04, an Intel i5-4200M CPU at 2.5 Ghz
and 12 GB RAM. In parallelized computations we have limited the number of threads
used to 30. In Tables 11 and 13, 4x and 30x indicates parallelization with 4 and 30 threads,
respectively. As the large examples below show, the parallelization scales efficiently; see
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Polytope dim #vertices #supp # triangulation # Stanley dec
C 8 16 11 17 33
Q 6 12 8 14 14
E 13 170 18 18208 19999
F 13 163 18 23738 41963
K 14 63 18 1035 2070
BSg 13 100 18 3696 6025
BSgRev 13 115 19 10342 26024
TABLE 10. Numerical data of symmetrized polytopes
also Table 12. The version that we have used exchanges data via files. The laptop has an
SSD , but the server has only hard disks, and it is not a local hard disk of the machine, but
the files must go through the NFS, the network file system.
Normaliz and NmzIntegrate need relatively little memory. All computations mentioned
in this paper run stably with < 0.5 GB of RAM for each thread used.
5.4. Volumes. Table 11 contains the computation times for the volumes of the studied
polytopes. The input for all these examples is given in the form of inequalities. When one
runs Normaliz on such examples, it first computes the extreme rays of the cone and uses
them as generators. This small extra time is also included in the reported times below.
(It is also apparent and not surprising that small examples profit from a small number of
parallel threads.)
Polytope Symmetrize Laptop 4x Server 30x
C Yes 0.100 s 0.591 s
Q Yes 0.33 s 0.76 s
E Yes 1:11:39 h 8:41 m
F Yes 1:48:57 h 15:06 m
T No 7.200 s 10.455 s
K Yes 0.660 s 1.940 s
BSt No – 3:57:26 h
BSg Yes 14:51 m 1:39 m
BSgRev Yes 44:54 m 4:17 m
TABLE 11. Computation times for volumes
In order to measure the parallelization we have run the volume computation of E with
varying number of threads. Table 12 shows that NmzIntegrate is very efficiently paral-
lelized.
Remark 10. The volume of the polytope C was first computed by Gehrlein [19]. The
volumes of variants of the polytopes Q and E had been computed by Schu¨rmann [24]
with LattE integrale [4]. This information was very useful for checking the correctness of
Normaliz.
22 W. BRUNS, B. ICHIM, AND C. SO¨GER
# threads 1 5 10 20 30
real time s 10367 2380 1245 656 521
efficiency % 100 88 83 79 66
TABLE 12. Efficiency of parallelization in volume computations
5.5. Ehrhart series and quasipolynomials. The experimental times obtained for com-
putation of Ehrhart series and quasipolynomials are contained in Table 13. As above, the
presented times include the time used by Normaliz for computing the extreme rays of
the cone. Moreover, the Ehrhart quasipolynomials are computed from the Ehrhart series
(see [11]). This requires for some examples like BSt a significant extra time, which has
likewise been included. We have also measured the parallelization for the Ehrhart series
computation of BSt; see Table 14. Somewhat surprisingly, the efficiency is > 100% for
certain numbers of threads, an effect that can only be explained by the memory manage-
ment of the system.
Polytope Symmetrize Laptop 4x Server 30x
closed semi-open closed semi-open
C Yes 1.730 s 1.940 s 1.925 s 2.077 s
Q Yes 4.400 s 7.64 s 7.010 s 8.440 s
E Yes 4:50:55 h 4:45:24 h 28:36 m 41:01 m
F Yes 12:02:42 h 12:47:03 h 1:45:15 h 1:39:19 h
T No 16.230 s 28.260 s 24.050 s 34.136 s
K Yes 16.770 s 25.810 s 3.156 s 7.967 s
BSt No – – 10:08:50 h 37:03:26 h
BSg Yes 1:34:23 h 1:36:16 h 9:01 m 14:13 m
BSgRev Yes 5:56:18 h 5:53:38 h 45:13 m 47:22 m
TABLE 13. Computation times for Ehrhart series and quasipolynomials
# threads 1 5 10 20 30
real time s 15959 398 1230 635 553
efficiency % 100 94 130 126 96
TABLE 14. Efficiency of parallelization in Ehrhart series computations
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